Research on sequences of outcomes shows that people care about features of the experience, such as improvement or deterioration over time, and peak and end levels, that the discounted utility model (DU) assumes they do not care about. In contrast to the finding that some attributes are weighted more than DU predicts, Kahneman and coauthors have proposed that there is one feature of sequences that DU predicts people should care about but that people in fact ignore or underweight: duration . We extend this line of research by investigating the role of conversational norms (Grice, 1975) , and scale norming (Kahneman and Miller, 1986) . We examine the impact of these two factors in four parallel studies that manipulate these factors orthogonally. Our major finding is that response modes that reduce reliance on conversational norms or standard of comparison, also increase the attention that subjects pay to duration.
Role of Duration 5 they label an "additive duration effect" (Schreiber and Kahneman, forthcoming) . The additive duration effect means that people do care at least weakly about duration, but that their concern for duration does not depend on the intensity of the stimuli whose duration is varied. DU, in contrast, predicts that the impact of the duration of an experience depends on its intensity -e.g., that people should care much more about how long a 110 volt shock lasts than they care about how long a 10 volt shock lasts. The additive duration effect would imply that people's aversion to extending the shock does not depend on the intensity of the shock which, if true, could lead to extremely suboptimal decision making behavior.
Our focus in this paper is not on the question of whether people neglect duration, either globally, or in the additive sense, but on factors that influence the weight that decision makers place on duration. As Kahneman and his coauthors acknowledge, people's concern for duration is unlikely to be fixed across situations, but is likely to be greater in some situations than in others.
We examine two factors that, based on prior research, we expected to affect the weight that people would place on duration. First, we predicted that the weight placed on duration would depend on the nature of the evaluation that people are asked to make, and specifically whether people are asked to rate the desirability of different sequences or make decisions about them (e.g., price them or choose between them). Second, we predicted that the weight placed on duration would depend on whether people evaluate sequences one-at-a-time or in an explicitly comparative fashion. After reviewing past literature on the role of duration in evaluations of sequences, we turn to a discussion of the theoretical considerations that led us to focus on these two factors. Our empirical analysis, in the following section, examines the impact of both of these factors. We end with a discussion of normative issues regarding the role of duration in encoding and decision making.
Summary of Past Findings on the Importance of Duration Varey and Kahneman (1992) were the first to draw attention to the problem of duration neglect. They presented subjects with hypothetical experiences that differed in duration and in intensity-pattern over time and asked them to provide a global evaluation of each experience on a 0-Role of Duration 6 final intensities of the experiences, with little weight on duration. They also observed violations of monotonicity. For example, subjects rated the overall pain in the hypothetical sequence {2, 5, 8} as worse than the overall pain in the sequence {2, 5, 8, 4}. Whereas this first study was prospective, in the sense that research participants evaluated sequences that they had not previously experienced, subsequent investigations of the impact of duration have all been retrospective, meaning that participants evaluate sequences they have been previously exposed to. By examining retrospective, as opposed to prospective, evaluation of sequences, this research focuses on how people remember and encode past experiences rather than on how they choose experiences.
The first of these investigations (Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993) focused on the role of duration in overall retrospective ratings of affective episodes. In the first study reported in that paper, the authors showed subjects either long and short movie clips which were pleasant (e.g., a puppy playing) or unpleasant (an amputation) and asked them to provide a global rating of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the experience. Fredrickson and Kahneman's results showed that after accounting for the maximum and final intensities, duration had little impact on these subjects' overall evaluations. A second study reported in the same paper employed rankings instead of ratings. Subjects ranked sequences of pleasant or unpleasant films in order of overall pleasantness or unpleasantness. Again providing support for duration neglect, after accounting for the peak and end intensities, rankings of pleasant and unpleasant film clips were unrelated to the duration of the clips. Redelmeier & Kahneman (1996) conducted a study with patients who underwent colonoscopy or lithotripsy. Patients were asked to report the total pain they experienced on a 10-point scale. The treatments in their study varied substantially in the amount of time they took (4 -67 min. for colonoscopy and 18 -51 min. for lithotripsy). Nevertheless, the results showed no significant correlation between the duration of the procedure and its retrospective evaluation. A similar neglect of duration emerged when they asked for the physicians' retrospective evaluations of the patients' pain. 1 Three other studies obtained mixed support for duration neglect with aversive stimuli. Schreiber & Kahneman (forthcoming) found that longer unpleasant sounds were evaluated as Role of Duration 7 worse than shorted sounds. The effect of duration in their experiments was apparent when examining the effect of duration as the only independent variable, and also after accounting for the maximum and ending intensities of the sequences. Schreiber & Kahneman point out that although the effect of duration was substantial, it was not multiplicative, which they referred to as an "additive duration effect." Finally, although they did not test the idea directly, Schreiber & Kahneman suggested that duration was salient in their experiments because subjects evaluated multiple sounds of varying durations. Ariely (1998) compared the impact of duration on ratings of stimuli that did not change much over time (constant) and stimuli that had substantial changes in their magnitude over time (patterned) . His experiments, which involved real pain (produced by either a heat probe or pressure applied to the finger), revealed that, although the ratings of constant sequences were not affected by changing their duration, the ratings of patterned sequences were sensitive to their duration. His research thus suggests that attention to duration may depend, in part, on the specific nature of the sequences being evaluated.
Another factor that seems to influence attention to duration is attentional focus. In a study that illustrates the importance of focus of attention, Rinot & Zakay (1999) had some subjects evaluate the overall annoyance they experienced from each sound in a series of annoying sounds, and others evaluate both the overall annoyance, and the duration of each experience. The overall evaluations of subjects in the latter condition were more sensitive to duration.
In addition to relying mostly on retrospective judgments, the studies just reviewed employed mostly (but not exclusively) ratings as the dependent measure. Two other studies, one involving sequences of discomfort from cold water (Kahneman et al., 1993) and the other involving sequences of aversive noise (Schreiber & Kahneman, forthcoming) used, in addition to ratings, dependent measures involving choice. In both studies, subjects chose between specific sequences of aversive sensations (cold water and noise) and dominated sequences that were created by adding mildly aversive segments -i.e. an extra period of mildly cold water or an extra period of moderately loud sound. In the cold water study (Kahneman et al., 1993) , subjects experienced two trials of cold water discomfort, one short and one long. In the short trial, subjects immersed their hand in mildly cold water (14 C/57 F) for 60 seconds. In the long trial, they immersed their Role of Duration 8 hand in the same cold water (14 C/57 F) for 60 seconds followed by 30 seconds at a slightly more comfortable temperature (15 C/59 F). When subjects later chose which of the two trials to repeat, a significant majority (69%) opted to repeat the long trial. In the aversive noise study (Schreiber & Kahneman, forthcoming) subjects were exposed sequentially to two sequences of aversive noise which were identical except that one sequence added a period of mildly aversive noise at the end.
Despite the fact that the shorter sequence dominated the one with noise added to the end; the majority of subjects violated dominance for several of the stimulus pairs -that is, they chose a sequence that contained the other sequence plus some discomfort.
Kahneman and his coauthors concluded from the fact that subjects chose to repeat the longer, dominated sequence, that they must not be attending to duration. However, alternative conclusions are plausible, such as that subjects put considerable weight on end level or on final slope. In fact, all that can be concluded from dominance violations is that subjects do not base their overall evaluations of sequences on the integral (sum) of pleasure or pain. Any deviation from integration, such as giving special weight to peak, end, final slope, or any other specific feature of the sequence, can produce violations of dominance, regardless of whether subjects do or do not attend to duration. Consider, for example, the sequences of pain {2, 5, 8} and {2, 5, 8, 4} where the former dominates the latter (large numbers refer to greater pain). An individual who based her overall value of a sequence on the sum plus the final slope, v(x 1 ,x 2 , ..x n ) = Σ x i + (x n -x n-1 ), is fully sensitive to duration, but would nevertheless value the former at 18 and the latter at 15, and would thus prefer the latter. Thus, violations of dominance do not, in and of themselves, point to duration neglect. Neglect of duration could, of course, produce or contribute to violations of dominance in the same way that disproportionate weighting of final slope or end level could, but duration neglect is not a necessary condition for dominance violations to occur. In these studies, therefore, it is possible that subjects cared a lot about duration but that their concern for duration was overwhelmed by either a preference for improvement or (closely related) a preference for ending on a good note. To test for duration neglect, per se, requires a systematic investigation of Role of Duration 9 the impact of duration on evaluations of sequences as compared with one or more other sequence features (e.g., peak, end, slope, average intensity).
In sum, support for complete duration neglect is mixed. Among those studies that have systematically manipulated duration, several have failed to observe any impact of duration on ratings of hedonic stimuli. However, some studies have observed some impact of duration -on rankings of aversive sequences of stimuli (Schreiber & Kahneman, forthcoming) , on ratings of patterned stimuli (Ariely, 1998) , and on ratings of aversive sequences of stimuli when duration was also estimated (Rinot and Zakay, 1999) . In addition, two studies involving choice have documented violations of dominance that could be, but are not necessarily, attributable to duration neglect.
Whether people do or do not take duration into account in retrospective evaluations, or the degree to which they do, may, however, be inherently unproductive questions to explore. In fact, there appear to be some situations in which people place little weight (possibly zero) on duration and others in which they care about it a lot. A more fruitful line of inquiry, therefore, may be to investigate when and why respondents show much or little concern for duration. Next, we will detail two factors that we predicted would affect the concern that respondents will show for duration: the type of evaluation being made and whether the evaluation is or is not explicitly comparative.
Mechanisms that Could Affect the Weight Placed on Duration
Type of evaluation goal (rating versus decision): As noted in the review of past research on duration neglect, many studies examining the impact of duration have employed ratings as a primary dependent measure. The implicit argument in this work -indeed the motivation for doing it -has been that, if people neglect duration in ratings of extended episodes, they are also likely to do so when they make choices between such episodes. There are good reasons to question whether this assumption is correct. Like people who are engaged in ordinary conversations, research participants naturally assume that the answers they provide to the questions they are asked will serve some kind of purpose (Clark & Schober, 1991) . Different response methods may incorporate duration to a different extent in part because the purpose to which the evaluations are Role of Duration 10 likely to be put is different or is expected to be different. Ratings of experiences are generally used for one of two purposes: (1) to communicate preferences to other persons and (2) to encode one's own preferences for use in future decision making. For either of these purposes, ignoring duration may be perfectly appropriate.
Communicating preferences to others: Grice (1975 Grice ( , 1987 proposed that conversationalists attempt (and believe that their partners will try) to make their utterances relate to commonly recognized goals (the maxim of relation). Supporting this assertion, research on conversational norms has found that speakers alter their communications based on their partner's goals in a conversation (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Russell & Schober, 1999) . The idea that people try to provide conversational partners with information that is relevant to their goals may help to explain why people's ratings of the "overall" or "global" goodness or badness of a sequence might not take its duration into account.
There are several possible ways to interpret the request to provide a global rating of a sequence. Under many, if not most, of these interpretations, duration neglect is entirely appropriate. Suppose, for example, that a colleague asked you: "Overall, how would you rate your recent trip to the Grand Canyon?" In this situation, the appropriate response is probably one that does not incorporate the duration of your recent trip. You would most likely mislead your colleague if you tried to factor the duration of your visit into your response -i.e., to rate it more extremely simply because you spent a long time there (except insofar as duration affected your average momentary pleasure from the visit). The typical reason for being asked a question of this type is that the questioner is evaluating the desirability of a visit to the canyon. The most useful answer, which would be in line with the questioner's expectations, is to give some type of average rating of your visit that does not encode duration. If you responded "wonderful" because you had spent a full 2 weeks of slightly better-than-average days at the canyon, the questioner would be severely misled. The same would be true if you responded "awful" because you had spent only one, albeit spectacular, day at the canyon. The questioner may not know how long you spent there, and you are unlikely to know how long they plan to spend there if they do visit. Indeed, the questioner may use your answer to the question, in part, to decide how long to spend there.
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The implication of conversational norms for laboratory research on duration neglect is that the insensitivity to duration often observed in summary evaluations of sequences may reflect subjects' interpretation of the question they are being asked, rather than an 'actual' lack of concern for duration.
In all the experiments discussed here, care was taken to use wording that would elicit overall global evaluations that sum the experience over time (using wording such as "global evaluation of how bad the overall experience is", "the total amount of pain", "maximize the overall pleasantness of the experience").
3 Even if people understand what is being asked for, however, "total amount of pain" may be an alien concept for subjects who are not used to summing pain over time. Asking for total quantities of experiences, such as sleep or calorie intake is perfectly normal. But, in other cases, the concept of a 'total' is less well defined. For example, most people would find it difficult to answer a question such as "what was the total volume of the rock concert?," or "what was the total windiness this morning?" Variables such as badness (Kahneman and Varey, 1992) , pleasure (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993) , and pain (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996) lie somewhere between these two extremes. Reporting the total pain one experiences over an interval is noncustomary, although it is conceivable that people could do it if they were asked to. In all of these cases, subjects could plausibly interpret the question they are being asked to answer as one that does not call for an explicit incorporation of duration. Given the ambiguity in what the question is calling for, duration neglect in overall ratings may be sensible and not necessarily indicative of the concern that subjects would show for duration if they were actually making decisions involving sequences of experiences.
Encoding preferences for use in future decision making: An analogous argument applies to situations in which one rates an extended episode for use as an input into one's own future decision making. For purposes of future decision making -i.e., deciding whether to repeat a past experience -it is almost certainly more useful to code a summary measure of desirability that does not include duration. Such a duration-free evaluation allows the decision maker to take the planned duration of the future episode into account as he or she wants to at the time of making the decision.
If duration were encoded into the stored representation of desirability, and the decision maker was deciding whether to experience a new episode of different duration from the one already depended strongly and monotonically on the duration of the pain they would be exposed to.
Hoeffler and Ariely (1999) examined how people learn tradeoffs between attributes (duration, intensity and money) over time. Their results clearly show that subjects traded off duration against the other two attributes. Ariely, Loewenstein & Prelec (1999) elicited subjects' willingness to listen to loud noises of varying duration in exchange for payment. Again, WTA depended on duration in a highly systematic fashion. Our first central prediction, therefore, contrasts the role of duration in ratings and decisions:
Role of Duration 13 Prediction 1: There will be greater sensitivity to duration when subjects make decisions about sequences than when they rate them for encoding or communication purposes.
Separate versus comparative valuation: A second (and closely related) influence on the weighting of duration is whether sequences are evaluated comparatively -by explicitly comparing them to one-another -or separately -i.e., one-at-a-time. There is a substantial literature documenting dramatic differences in preference between these two modes of evaluation (Hsee et al. 1999; Nowlis and Simonson, 1997; Tversky, 1969) .
Evaluability : One specific cause of such divergences is what Hsee (1996; Hsee et al., 1999) call the evaluability effect: When judging items separately -i.e., one-at-a-time -attributes that are not easily judged independently are given little weight. However, when the same items are judged in an environment that facilitates comparison to other items, respondents place much greater weight on the same attributes. For example, in one study reported in Hsee (1996) , participants were asked how much salary they would be willing to pay to two job candidates who differed in their experience with the programming language they would be using and also differed on their undergraduate GPA. One candidate had higher GPA while the other was more experienced with the programming language. In the joint evaluation condition, participants were presented with the information on the two candidates side by side. In the separate evaluation condition, participants were presented with the information on only one of the candidates. The results revealed a significant preference reversal as a function of whether the information was presented jointly or separately. In joint evaluation, willingness-to-pay salaries were higher for the candidate who had more programming experienced. In the separate evaluation, willingness-to-pay salaries were higher for the candidate with the higher GPA. Hsee et al (1999) attribute this effect (and a variety of related effects documented in their review) to the fact that programming experience is an attribute that is difficult to evaluate -people don't know what a good or bad amount of experience would be -and hence receives much lower weight, when alternatives are evaluated separately.
Expanding these findings to the issue of duration neglect suggest that (if duration is not easily judged separately) judgments of a single experience without a referent (such as ratings) will show little concern for duration, while comparative judgments (where there is a standard of comparison),
Role of Duration 14 will show much higher concern for duration. Indeed, there is some suggestive evidence that people have difficulty evaluating duration as an attribute. Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec and Vaughan (1993) conducted a series of studies to test Herrnstein's "melioration" theory of choice.
The theory applies to situations in which people make choices between alternatives, where the choices they make have internalities -they affect the quality of alternatives they will face in the future. The concept of melioration refers to the assertion that people ignore such internalities. In a series of studies, subjects experienced a sequence of trials in which they chose between two buttons that caused coins to drop from a hopper and accumulate as earnings. Choosing one button always led to a higher immediate payoff, but also cause the value of coins from both hoppers to decline to such an extent that total earnings would be lower. This was the meliorating choice -the choice people would naturally make if they ignored the effects of their choices on coin value. In some studies, making the meliorating choice caused the value of subsequent coins to decline; in other studies making the meliorating choice led to an increase in the time delay prior to each drop of a coin (which also led to a decline in total payoffs that was equivalent to the declining coin value conditions). Consistent with the notion that people have difficulty evaluating duration, subjects were much more likely to meliorate -to ignore the internality -in the coin delay condition than in the declining coin value condition.
Scale norming . A second important cause of discrepancies between comparative and separate evaluation is automatic scale norming. In their presentation of "norm theory," Kahneman and Miller (1986) show that virtually all evaluations automatically evoke some type of norm of comparison -even those that are not explicitly comparative. In rating the Grand Canyon visit, for example, you will likely compare it to other vacation trips you took, or even, perhaps, to other trips you took to the Southwestern United States. You are unlikely to compare the Grand Canyon trip to the average restaurant dinner or game of squash. The same principle applies to duration.
When you evaluate a particular morning's commute, you are unlikely to evaluate it relative to a recent drive cross-country. Duration is one of many variables that people use to classify stimuli for purposes of scale-norming.
duration, it is possible that they will norm each sequence against sequences of similar duration. If they do so, they will exhibit duration neglect, regardless of whether they take duration into account when making decisions about sequences. Thus, if subjects are asked to rate sequences of similar duration, and duration is only manipulated between-subject, duration neglect would seem to be virtually inevitable. Duration neglect is also be likely to be observed if subjects rate experiences that differ in duration but also differ on some other important dimension. For example, if subjects rated a pleasurable 2-week vacation and an unpleasant 1-week work trip, they would probably norm the vacation against other vacations and the work trip against other work trips. Duration would then be neglected, even though it was explicitly manipulated in a within-subject design.
Automatic scale-norming of this type would be much less likely, and attention to duration commensurately more likely, if people compare experiences that are similar on most dimensions other than duration. In such a situation, duration would be highly salient, and it would most likely be taken into account. Indeed Schreiber & Kahneman (forthcoming) suggest that once subjects experience multiple episodes, they began to rely more heavily on the experience's duration in their judgments (see also Rinot & Zakay 1999; Ariely and Carmon forthcoming) . The preceding discussion points to a second major prediction:
Prediction 2: There will be greater sensitivity to duration when subjects engage in evaluations that involve explicit comparisons between sequences than when they evaluate sequences one-at-a-time.
Why other features of sequences, such as patterns, may not be influenced by evaluation goals & comparison standards
What about other features of sequences, such as their peak, end, and slope? Should we expect these features to differ as a function of these two factors -i.e., ratings versus decisions and separate versus comparative evaluation? Again, the answer may lie, in part, in conversational norms and norms of evaluation. In some cases, such features are an inherent, immutable, aspect of a sequence. For example, movies provide a specific sequence of affect, and hikes and whitewater rafting trips typically provide a relatively invariant sequence of terrain and excitement.
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In such cases, it is consistent with conversational norms to incorporate these features into one's evaluation. Thus, in recommending a film to another person it would be a mistake to ignore the fact that the movie's happy ending left you feeling exhilarated. Evaluative norming also does not normally imply a neglect of these other sequences. Most people don't rate films or wilderness excursions relative to other films or excursions which have similar peaks, ends, or temporal patterns of affect.
The situations changes somewhat for extended experiences consisting of components that do not have an inherent temporal order. For example, consider a four day visit to the Grand Canyon in which it rained for either the first two or last two days. Most people would choose to experience the rain on the first two days, consistent with the widespread preference for improving sequences.
If the purpose of a rating is to provide a recommendation, however, it would be less normatively desirable to rate such an improving vacation as more desirable since the person requesting the rating may not be aware of the specific weather pattern that prevailed and can certainly not predict the weather that will prevail on his or her prospective visit. It is not clear, however, whether people, in practice, factor out improvement and features that result from the ordering of changeable sequence components. As Schwarz and coauthors have shown for judgments of subjective well being (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz 1996 ), people's tendency to remove such transient influences depends in part on whether the features are made salient. For example, if a person would be more likely to factor weather-induced improvement out of her ratings of a Grand Canyon visit if she was first asked to report on the weather during the trip. These considerations led to a third prediction:
Prediction 3: The impact of sequence pattern (e.g., increasing versus decreasing) on evaluations will be relatively invariant across ratings versus choice and comparative versus one-ata-time evaluations.
We test these predictions in four parallel experiments in which subjects evaluated sequences of aversive noise. The four experiments differed in the type of evaluation that was elicited from subjects. To test the first prediction, two of the four experiments used ratings as a dependent
Role of Duration 17 measure and the other two employed measures that involved decisions. To test the second prediction, in two of the four experiments (crossed orthogonally with the first manipulation), subjects evaluated sequences separately, and in the other two they evaluated sequences in a comparative fashion -relative to a "standard sequence." The four experiments can thus be viewed as composing the four cells of a two-by-two factorial design.
The first experiment adopted the one-at-a-time ratings of sequences method used in most prior research: Subjects rated the "overall annoyance" of each sequence. The second experiment introduced the element of decision, while retaining one-at-a-time evaluation by having subjects evaluate willingness to accept monetary compensation for listening to each sequence again. The third experiment involved comparative evaluation without decisions by having subjects rate sequences of sound relative to a fixed "standard sequence" that was identical for all subjects and constant across all the trials in the experiment. The fourth experiment involved both comparative evaluation and decision; after exposure to each sequence, subjects decided whether they prefer to re-experience that sequence or to experience the standard sequence (the same standard used in the third experiment).
The Studies Subjects
Subjects in studies 1 (separate ratings) and 4 (choice) were Duke University undergraduates.
Subjects in studies 2 (willingness to accept pain in exchange for payment; WTA) and 3 (rating relative to standard) were Massachusetts Institute of Technology undergraduates. Although our main findings relate to comparisons across studies, it is very unlikely that these arise from the differences in subject population, particularly in light of the fact that, as predicted, the greatest differences in attention to duration were observed between studies 1 and 4, which were conducted with the same subject population.
Stimuli
The stimuli used in all four experiments were annoying sounds. These have two desirable
properties: (1) they permit delivery of many stimuli to a single subject, unlike, e.g., cold water, and (2) they show little or no adaptation over time (Ariely & Zauberman, forthcoming) , which
Role of Duration 18 means that subjective stimulus levels correspond closely to objective levels, with little effect of prior exposure. 5 This property is especially important for work on sequences since, with adaptation, preference for improvement could be due to the fact that adaptation to adverse early stimuli renders later stimuli less noxious.
To generate the stimuli, we used a tone generating application (SoundEdit) and created a 16 bit triangular wave in a frequency of 3,000 Hz, 10% Amplitude. These sounds were delivered via a computer sound card (Crystal 3D 16bit). The different intensity levels were created by starting with a single base sound and systematically manipulating its intensity between 50% and 80%
(corresponding approximately to 60db -80db). All stimuli sounded like a high pitched scream, similar to the broadcasting warning signal. All four experiments used 27 stimuli (see Figure 1 ), which were grouped into two clusters: Constant and patterned. Constant stimuli did not change in intensity over time. Constant stimuli were presented in three durations (10 seconds, 15 seconds, and 22.5 seconds) and five different intensity levels (which we henceforth refer to as levels 1 to 5), making a total of 15 different stimuli. Patterned stimuli did change in intensity over time.
Patterned stimuli included four specific temporal trajectories (Up, Down, Up&Down, and The four experiments differed in the procedure and dependent measures that subjects used to evaluate the 27 different stimuli. Because the main hypotheses involve comparisons across the four experiments, we present the methods from all four studies before presenting results from any of them.
Common Elements
Subjects sat in front of a computer and wore headphones. To introduce them to the sounds, they were first presented with sample sounds that spanned the whole range of the stimuli from the weakest to the most extreme Constant sounds, as well as the Up and the Down sounds. After
Role of Duration 19 indicating that this was an acceptable range for them to continue with the experiment, the specific instructions were given to them (depending on the specific experiment they participated in). After completing the experiment, subjects were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation. Table 1 summarizes the four experiments in a way that highlights their connection to the two major predictions discussed in the previous section.
•
Separate ratings of sound sequences (traditional method: Separate/Ratings): After the initial introduction and instructions, subjects received each of the 27 stimuli in a random order. On each of the 27 trials, subjects were presented with a screen that asked they if they were ready to experience the next sound. Once they answered positively to this question, the trial proceeded and one of the sounds was played. After the sound terminated, subjects were asked to rate "Overall how annoying was it?" and responded on a 100-point scale with 0 being not annoying at all and 100 being very annoying.
6
Experiment 2 .
Willingness to repeat sound sequences in exchange for payment (Separate/Decision): After the initial introduction and instructions, subjects were told that the experiment consisted of two parts. In part 1, they would hear a series of annoying sounds and, after each one, would state the lowest price they would demand as a compensation for hearing the sound again. Subjects were told that in stage 2 of the experiment the computer would randomly generate a price for each sound. If their stated price was lower than this price then they would be exposed to the sound again and get paid accordingly. If their stated price was higher, then they would not be exposed to the sound again. Subjects received each of the 27 stimuli in a random order. On each of the 27 trials, subjects were presented with a screen that asked them if they were ready to experience the next sound. Once they answered positively to this question the trial proceeded, one of the sounds was played, and they stated "the minimum price for which you would be willing to listen to the Role of Duration 20 same sound again in stage 2 of the experiment." We set up the experiment in this way to maintain a similarity in the amount of experience and sounds that subject experience the same across all four experiments. During stage 1 of the experiment subjects made real decisions that, they believed, had immediate implications for their near future. But, after making these 27 responses, subjects
were spared a repetition of the annoying stimuli.
Experiment 3 .
Rating of sound sequences relative to a fixed standard (Comparative/Ratings): After the initial introduction and instructions, subjects were asked to listen repeatedly (8 times) to a sound that was labeled the standard stimulus. Subjects were told to listen carefully to this sound in order to become familiar and remember it for future judgments. This standard stimulus was always constant at a level of 3 (the midpoint of the range) with a duration of 15 seconds (the intermediate value of the three stimulus durations). The results suggest that this procedure was successful in helping subjects remember the standard sound. The mean rating of the standard was 50.556, which was not significantly different than the desired mean of 50 (t = 0.403, p = 0.688). The implied choice proportions were 49%, which were also not statistically different than the expected 50% (t = -0.15, p = 0.88). After they became familiar with the standard, subjects received each of the 27 stimuli in a random order. On each of the 27 trials, subjects were presented with a screen that asked if they were ready to experience the next sound. Once they answered this question positively, the trial proceeded and one of the sounds was played. After listening to each of the sequences, subjects were asked "overall how annoying was the sound you just heard compared with the standard?" This annoyance rating was done on a 100-point scale where 0 meant not annoying at all, 50 meant that the annoyance was equivalent to that of the standard sequence, and 100 meant that the sequence was very annoying.
Experiment 4 .
Choice between sound sequences (Comparative/Decision): After the initial introduction and instructions, subjects were asked to listen, learn, and become familiar with the standard stimulus (the same as used in Experiment 3). After becoming familiar with the standard, subjects were told Role of Duration 21 that the experiment had two parts to it. In part 1 of the experiment they would get a new annoying sound and upon its termination would be asked to choose whether, in stage 2 of the experiment, they would prefer to experience the stimulus they just experienced, or the standard stimulus.
Subjects were also told that after making several such choices they would participate in a second stage of the experiment in which they would be exposed to all the sounds they had chosen in the first stage. We set up the experiment in this way to maintain uniformity in subjects' exposure to sounds across the four experiments. During stage 1 of the experiment, subjects made real choices that, they believed, had immediate implications for their near future. But, after making these 27 responses, subjects were spared a repetition of the annoying stimuli.
On each choice occasion, subjects saw a scale on the computer screen with a probe at its middle. The scale was anchored on the left by "Absolutely certain I prefer the standard," and on the right by "Absolutely certain I prefer the new sound." Subjects moved the probe by pressing on the right and left arrow keys. They were not allowed to keep the probe at the middle (indifference). The instructions for using this 'graded choice' method emphasized the two aspects of the response. Subjects were instructed that their decision to move the probe either left or right from the center of the scale would completely determine the choice outcome they would experience in stage 2 of the experiment. They were told that distance of movement on the scale should reflect their confidence in a particular choice.
On each of the 27 trials, subjects were presented with a screen that asked them if they were ready to experience the next sound. When they responded positively, the trial proceeded and one of the sounds was played. After the sound terminated, the graded choice scale appeared on the screen and subjects used it to express their preferences. To help the subjects remember the standard, yet not present it too many times, subjects were given the standard stimulus as a reminder on every sixth trial.
To facilitate comparison with the annoyance ratings from the previous studies, in presenting the results we express both choices and confidence judgment on scales in which high numbers indicate preference for the standard sequence -i.e., in which high numbers indicate that they dislike a particular sequence. We encoded two dependent measures: choices, which were binary variables coded as 0 when the subject chose the focal sequence and 1 when the subject chose the Role of Duration 22 standard sequence, and graded choices, which also ranged from 0 (meaning that subjects expressed complete confidence in their choice of the focal sequence) to 100 (meaning that subjects expressed complete confidence in their choice of the standard sequence). with sd of 0.28) from experiment 2, and the 0-100 'graded choices' from experiment 4. The first row includes both patterned and constant stimuli, the second row includes only constant stimuli, and the third row includes only patterned stimuli.
Results

Impact of duration (Predictions
Visual inspection of the figure suggests that, consistent with Prediction 1, duration had a greater impact on evaluations in the WTA experiment (in which subjects engaged in decisions) than in the ratings experiment. Likewise it appears that, consistent with Prediction 2, duration had a greater impact on evaluations in the rating-relative-to-standard experiment than in the ratings experiment. Consistent with the idea that both considerations are important, the impact of duration appears to be greatest in the choice experiment.
• Table 2 , which compares the impact of duration on ratings in the four experiments on the basis of standardized regression coefficients (first row) and R 2 (% of variance explained by duration). Both comparisons reinforce the visual impression in Figure 2 that the ratings experiment is an outlier in terms of the small impact of duration on evaluations. In all of the other conditions, subjects display substantial concern for duration.
However, the regression analyses do not support the visual impression that concern for duration is greater in the choice experiment (experiment 4) than in experiments 2 and 3. These conclusions Role of Duration 23 were substantiated in a 2x2 ANOVA in which subjects' individual standardized regression coefficients were analyzed as a function of whether the evaluations were susceptible to issues of evaluation goals (yes for experiments 1 and 3; not for 2 and 4) and whether the evaluations were susceptible to issues of standards of comparisons (yes for 1 and 2; no for 3 and 4). This analysis of the standardized regression coefficients yielded a significant main effect for evaluation goals [F(1,221) = 38.18, p < 0.001] and a significant main effect for standards of comparisons [F(1,221) = 6.43, p = 0.011]. As implied by Figure 2 and Table 2 , there was also a significant 2 way interaction, where the only experiment that yielded reduced weight to duration was the Rating Experiment [F(1,221) = 28.19, p < 0.001].
•• Table 2 about here •••
Note that in the between-experiment comparisons just presented, the choice condition was at a disadvantage because in that conditions the main response was binary, but converted into a 0-100 scale by using subjects' expressions of confidence in their choice. Another way to make comparisons across experiments is to compare the choices in experiment 4 to 'pseudo-choices' in the other conditions created by coding whether each sequence was evaluated higher or lower than the standard sequence. (In cases of ties, we alternated between coding a sequence as preferred and inferior). Figure 3 presents the results from such comparisons. In each of the graphs, the .5 level separates sequences that were, on average, evaluated as superior or inferior to the standard sequence. Again, the ratings experiment appears to be an outlier in terms of the low impact of duration on evaluations, although even in this condition duration has an effect; visual inspection suggests that concern for duration was greatest in the choice experiment. The bottom panel of Table 2 , which presents logistic regression coefficients and pseudo R 2 s from regressions of duration on choice, separately for each of the experiments, reinforces these conclusions.
• Duration, it can be seen, had a greater impact on evaluations in experiments 2, 3, and 4 than in experiment 1. However, this does not necessarily mean that the absolute impact of duration on judgments was large in these experiments. What does it mean for the impact of duration to be large or small? If intensity were on a ratio scale then it might be possible to compare, for example, the relative impact of doubling intensity versus doubling duration, but intensity is not a ratio scale.
Thus, the best we can do is to compare the impact of duration to the impact of other sequence features that were manipulated in the experiments. Note that the results of this regression will depend critically on the relative range of manipulated sequence features. Thus, for example, intensity would look more important if the range of intensity were greater in the experiment.
To examine the impact of duration relative to other sequence features we ran separate regressions for each subject, regressing the evaluations against the peak, ending value and duration of each of the 27 sequences. The results, which are presented in Table 3 , once again show that duration has the least impact on evaluations in the separate ratings experiment. In the WTA, ratingrelative-to-standard, and choice experiment, the impact of duration is of roughly similar magnitude to the impact of peak and end. In the ratings experiment, however, the impact of duration is much smaller than that of peak and end. Note that peak and end are only two of many different possible ways of summarizing the non-duration features of the sequences. We ran similar regressions using ending slope and mean value as explanatory variables rather than peak and end and obtained very similar results (see Table 3 ). (Ariely 1998; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993) , sequences that ended with an improving slope (Down and Up-Down) were rated more favorably than those which ended with a worsening trend of noise (Up and Down-Up). Supporting our third prediction, elimination of conversational norms (experiment 2), scale-norming (experiment 3) or both (experiment 4) did not change the taste for improvement significantly. A more detailed inspection of the preference for improvement reveals that in the WTA Experiment, this tendency was a bit lower than in the other three experiments, but it was highly significant in all cases.
• 
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When evaluating these sounds on a continuous scale our subject evaluates the first sounds as 20
(on a scale from 0 -100) and the second sound as 40 -thus showing his concern for duration. Now if the same subject was to evaluate the same stimuli using a choice method, the results would be somewhat different. In this case, the subject is asked to choose whether they want to experience each of the two sounds or the standard stimuli. If the subject evaluated the standard to be more aversive than both stimuli he would pick never to listen to the standard and if the subject evaluated the standard to be less aversive than both stimuli he would pick always to listen to the standard. In other words, unless the aversiveness of the standard is somewhere between the aversiveness of the focal stimuli the results will show insensitivity to duration. Supporting this idea, Figure 5 shows that in the experiments where there was a continuous response scales (such as Standard), subjects showed sensitivity to duration at each level. However in the Choice Experiment, sensitivity to duration was low for stimuli that are plotted at the top (highly annoying stimuli), or at the bottom (not very annoying stimuli). The highest sensitivity in the Choice Experiment is shown for stimuli that are in the middle range -those that can be traded off with the standard. Another interesting point relates to the curvature shown in the Choice Experiment. Very annoying sounds show sensitivity at the low durations and a decreased sensitivity at the high durations while not very annoying sounds show low sensitivity at the low durations and an increased sensitivity at the high durations. The combination of the overall change in sensitivity cross the range, and the curvature in the responses, strengthen our belief that subjects indeed traded off duration and intensity.
• The central goal of the current paper was to explore some mechanisms that we expected to affect the weight placed on duration in evaluations of sequences of outcomes. To do so, we examined the impact of different evaluation methods on the role of duration in evaluations. We employed a range of elicitation procedures: ratings as traditionally employed, ratings of sequences relative to a well specified "standard sequence," willingness to pay, and a graded choice procedure Role of Duration 27 in which subjects repeatedly chose between the standard sequence and each of the 27 focal sequences. Comparing these four evaluation methods, the ratings procedure commonly used in previous research elicited the least sensitivity to duration. This pattern was observed when subjects' evaluations of sequences were treated as continuous variables, and also when they were converted into a binary variable that designated preference relative to the standard sequence. The pattern of results was evident when the four experiments were compared on the basis of mean evaluations of the different stimuli, and also on the basis of a variety of different measures designed to capture concern for duration: standardized regression coefficients and R 2 s from regressions of continuous evaluations on duration, and standardized regression coefficients and pseudo-R 2 s from a logistic regression of the binary preference variable on duration. Moving from unanchored ratings to decisions (either WTA or pairwise choice) or from unanchored ratings to comparative ratings both have the effect of increasing the weight that people place on duration.
One may wonder whether the fact that our subjects made a series of similar evaluations in rapid succession (which is rare in daily life) may limit the generalizeability of our results to natural contexts. There are two important responses to this question. First, other studies (including Experiment 1) that have been interpreted as supportive of duration neglect (e.g., Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Schreiber & Kahneman, forthcoming) also involved repeated successive elicitation, so repetition does not seem to preclude duration neglect. Second, and more importantly, it is possible that successive elicitations did indeed produce greater sensitivity to duration (although it cannot explain the differences we observe between the different experiments).
When people make repeated decisions that differ on one or a small number of dimensions, these dimensions become highly salient and receive disproportionate weight in decision making (Keren, 1993) . The prediction that repetition will increase the weight placed on duration is supported by an examination of effect sizes in previous studies that focussed on duration. The only studies that found essentially complete duration neglect had either a single trial (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996) , or relatively few trials (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993) . Other studies which have used many trials have shown higher sensitivity to duration (Ariely 1998; Schreiber & Kahneman, forthcoming) . Such an attentional mechanisms is almost certainly another important factor, in addition to those examined in this paper, that can moderate the weight decision makers will place Role of Duration 28 on duration when they evaluate past experiences or choose between future experiences (see Rinot & Zakay 1999) .
Is Duration Neglect an Error?
To address the question of whether duration neglect is an error, it is important to draw a distinction between two ways in which the term "duration neglect" has been used. First, and more conservatively, duration neglect has been used to refer to the failure to encode duration into retrospective evaluations of extended experiences. Second, duration neglect has been used to refer to the underweighting of duration in prospective decisions involving extended experiences. By not taking this distinction into account, one implicitly assumes that a failure to encode duration will lead to a normatively wrong weight of duration in prospective decision. As we noted in the introduction, this second postulate almost certainly does not hold as there is ample evidence that decision makers do care considerably about the duration of experiences that they face.
Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of sequences:
The experiments reported in this paper show that people do, often, encode duration into retrospective evaluations of sequences.
However, in the one-at-a-time ratings experiment, subjects did seem to place relatively little weight on duration. Should such a tendency to place low weight on duration in retrospective ratings of extended experiences be viewed as a bias? We believe that such a conclusion would be premature.
As we noted earlier, in many situations optimal prospective decision making (and advice giving) involves duration neglect in retrospective evaluations. Whether one should incorporate duration into such ratings depends, in part, on the purpose to which the rating will be applied.
If retrospective ratings are used for the purpose of communicating preferences, there are, as we discussed, some situations in which conversational norms do warrant incorporation of duration. However, much more commonly, effective communication does not call for duration to be incorporated into summary ratings.
When retrospective ratings of sequences are used as inputs into future decisions, the situation is quite similar. When decision makers rate an extended episode they have experienced, there are Role of Duration 29 some situations in which it makes sense for this rating to take account of duration, but such situations are rare.
Consider the paradigmatic situation in which a retrospective rating is used as an input into future decisions. This is a situation in which an individual first experiences a particular extended episode and then, at a later point, must make a decision involving that episode, such as whether to experience it again. 7 Under what circumstances would it be beneficial for individuals to encode duration in their evaluations of the first episode?
When one knows how long the second experience will last, it is probably not optimal to encode duration into one's retrospective rating of the first experience. If one knows how long the second experience will last, and one has stored a duration-free summary of the first experience, such as its mean intensity, one can deal with duration explicitly in decisions involving the second episode.
Similar logic applies when one can exert control over the duration of the second episode.
In deciding how long to make the second episode, again it would be more useful to have a duration-free summary evaluation of the first episode.
Even when one does not know how long the second sequence will last and cannot choose how long it will last, encoding duration into one's summary experience is only beneficial if the two experiences are of approximately equal duration. To illustrate this point, consider a medical treatment that is very unpredictable in its duration, such as colonoscopy. Assume you had a colonoscopy in the past, and you are now considering whether to have another one. This is a situation in which you do not know how long the experience will last, neither can you control its duration. If the duration of the two colonoscopy treatments is about the same, encoding duration into your overall evaluation of the first colonoscopy would help you make a better decision about whether to repeat the experience in the future. However, if the duration of the two colonoscopy treatments is unpredictable from one to the other, encoding the duration of the first will provide no benefit.
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What if one were to show that people fail to incorporate duration into summary evaluations in exactly these situations -i.e., when they experience an initial extended episode then face a second choice involving an episode in which they (1) do not know how long the second episode will last, (2) cannot control its duration, but (3) know that its duration is about the same as the first episode? Would the failure to encode duration into the evaluation of the first episode constitute an error? Even if it would be optimal to encode duration in this situation, one may question whether it is reasonable to expect people to distinguish between this, rather unusual, situation and the many others which do not call for an encoding of duration. In summary, then, it would be premature to conclude that duration neglect in retrospective ratings of extended episodes is a bias in the sense of producing problems when it comes to either communicating preferences or making future decisions.
Duration neglect in prospective decisions involving sequences:
Although the main thrust of the research on duration neglect has been on how duration is encoded in retrospective evaluations, there has also been some discussion of rationality in prospective decisions.
Specifically, it has been argued that people should evaluate sequences by the integral, or sum over time, of the utility they provide (Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin, 1997) . According to this view, any pattern that deviates from integration, which would include not only insufficient attention to duration, but also giving extra weight to the peak, end or slope, is a mistake.
Again, we would argue that it is premature to classify these patterns of preferences as errors of decision making.
One complication, that was recognized by Kahneman Wakker and Sarin (1997) , is that people derive utility not only from direct experience, but also from anticipation and memories of experiences (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992) . If these sources of utility are important, as they often are, it could be perfectly rational to prefer a sequence that had a smaller integral of utility during the sequence but which conferred greater utility (or less disutility) from memory or anticipation. To the degree that pleasure or pain from memory and anticipation are not themselves influenced by duration, therefore, it can be normatively defensible to give duration less weight in choice. Thus,
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it can make good sense to prefer a longer colonoscopy that ends on a good note to a shorter one that ends in excruciating pain if the longer procedure is remembered more favorably, or if the next one is dreaded less, even if the integral of discomfort during the longer procedure is greater.
Even if one could measure utility from memory and anticipation, however, which would be exceedingly difficult, it is still questionable whether utility integration is a compelling normative principle. For many normative rules of choice, such as dominance (if A is better than B on all dimensions, then choose A) or transitivity (if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A should be preferred to C), many people are persuaded that the rule is normative when it is explained to them, and they generally want to change their behavior if they are made aware that they have violated the rule. This is not the case for utility integration. People often deviate dramatically from utility integration in prospective studies of preferences for sequences (e.g.,
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993) and they do not change their minds, even when the logic of doing so is explained (Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991) . People do care about properties of sequences other than the integral of utility that they provide. The fact that they do so knowingly and unapologetically, should make us wary of labeling their preference a bias.
Final comments
Because the salience of duration, like other choice attributes, varies across decision contexts, there is good reason to expect that duration will be underweighted in some situations and overweighted in others. Prior research has revealed some situations in which duration receives little weight in retrospective evaluations. However, whether these situations constitute errors of decision making, is open to dispute. Our research has illuminated at least three situations in which concern for duration is substantial. Our results suggest that people do take duration into account substantially when they decide whether to repeat an experience in exchange for payment, when they evaluate sequences comparatively or when they actually chose between sequences. Moreover, these three procedures do not seem particularly unrepresentative of those confronted in daily decision making. Pricing is certainly a common activity, as are comparative ratings and binary choices. Further research is clearly required to understand the conditions under which moderating 2. Arguing that duration neglect may sometimes be sensible does not mean that duration should be neglected in all settings. Childbirth, jail sentences, and waiting in line are some of the experiences that are readily and naturally described in terms of their duration. In fact, when asking "How bad was your wait in line at the supermarket?" the questioner is implicitly asking "How long did you have to wait?" perhaps with minor allowances for the conditions under which the waiting occurred (For an interesting discussion of queuing experiences see Carmon & Kahneman, 1996) .
3. In the second study by Fredrickson and Kahneman's (1993) , subjects were instructed to rank sequences to help the experimenters select clips for inclusion in a future study. For pleasant (unpleasant ) sequences, subjects were asked to "MAXIMIZE (MINIMIZE) the overall pleasantness (unpleasantness) of the experience of viewing the pleasant videotape that we make" (capitals in original). Based on the instructions they were given, subjects may have thought that neglect of duration was appropriate. They may well have believed that it would be most useful for the experimenters to have a measure of the average pleasantness or unpleasantness of the film clips that ignored duration since the researchers would make their own decisions about the duration of each clip that would be included in the final experiment.
4. This probably makes perfect sense. To truly take duration into account -by multiplying the utility of each experience by its duration -would imply that one should give any experience a rating of zero. Consider for example trying to describe the amazingly good day you just had Role of Duration 38 on a scale from 0 (very bad day) to 100 (a wonderful day). In trying to take duration into account, you realize that you could be asked in the future to say how good were the last two days, last week, last month, or even your whole lifetime (when you are on the verge of death).
Given that you want to obey the multiplicative criterion (which is equivalent to taking the integral of pleasure or pain), the maximum ratings you can give your day is 100 over the maximum amount of days you expect to live. In our case (since we expect to live to 90), this would be 100/ (364 x 90) = 0.00305.
5. There is a long history of formal and informal observations about the close relation between loudness and annoyance. For example, Stevens (1975, p. 69) commented on the similarity of results obtained when subjects are asked to match noises for loudness, noisiness, or annoyance.
6. In a different setting we asked 30 of the subjects whether their response would have changed if we had replaced "overall" with "Total." Twenty eight of the 30 subjects said they would have not changed their responses, and the two who changed their opinion gave slightly lower responses.
7. Note that this is exactly the kind of setup employed in studies, including our own and all past studies, that have examined the weighting of duration in choice.
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